The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984: An Unconstitutional Vesting of Subject Matter Jurisdiction by Wilensky, Sheldon A.
THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS AND FEDERAL
JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1984: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
VESTING OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In 1984 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984 in response to the Supreme Court's
holding in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. This
Comment argues that portions of the Act unconstitutionally seek
to expand federal subject matter jurisdiction in the bankruptcy
context. Although this expansion is applicable to all mass tort lit-
igation, this Comment uses asbestosis litigation as an example.
INTRODUCTION
On August 26, 1982, Johns-Manville Corporation (Johns-
Manville) filed for reorganization under title 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code." At the time of the filing, Johns-Manville was defending sev-
eral thousand asbestosis lawsuits which potentially threatened its ec-
onomic existence.2 By filing bankruptcy, Johns-Manville brought it-
self within the protection of the bankruptcy code's automatic stay
provisions, giving it time to work out a settlement structure which
would leave it a viable corporation.3 At the same time as the Johns-
1. Pacor v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 986 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing In re Johns-
Manville, Nos. 2 B 11656 to 82 B 11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 26, 1982)). Pacor
was a third party distributor of Johns-Manville products who sought to have the lawsuit
pending against it consolidated with the Johns-Manville case, either on a theory of
agency or third-party liability. Johns-Manville is a leading producer of asbestos products.
See generally Comment, Product Liability Claims in the Bankruptcy Courts after the
1984 Amendments: Four Standards to Limit "Related to" Jurisdiction, 17 U.C.D. L.
REv. 1247 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Roberts v. Johns-Manville Corp., 12 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 879,
881 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Roberts was one of some 25,000 people nationwide who
have sued Johns-Manville for personal injuries arising out of exposure to asbestos and
asbestos products).
3. Id. The court held that 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(l)-(8) (1982) was applicable.
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Manville filing, the Supreme Court decided Northern Pipeline Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.,4 a case which held that the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Act) 5 effectively granted the bankruptcy
courts unconstitutionally excessive subject matter jurisdiction.
In Marathon, the Court ruled that bankruptcy judges could not
adjudicate state law claims solely based upon the limited subject
matter jurisdiction constitutionally available to "legislative
courts"-those courts created by Congress pursuant to its power
under article I of the Constitution.' The Court, however, did not ad-
dress whether federal district court judges-article III judges-could
hear state law claims when federal jurisdiction was based solely upon
concurrent bankruptcy proceedings. Although the Marathon decision
was limited to deciding the constitutionality of bankruptcy judges'
power to sit as article III judges, prior case law requires constitu-
tional authority for any federal court to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction.7
As a result of the Marathon decision and the Johns-Manville
bankruptcy filing, Congress was faced with two related problems:
first, amending the Bankruptcy Act to bring the powers delegated to
the bankruptcy courts within constitutional limits; second, respond-
ing to the public outrage caused by the perceived abuse of a judicial
system which enables a presently solvent company to hide from
pending state court lawsuits by filing for reorganization under the
bankruptcy code.8 Consequently, under the 1984 Bankruptcy Act,
where a debtor is also a defendant in a tort action, the trial of that
tort action is removed to the federal district court from the state
court in which it is pending.9 Because the district court judge is an
article III judge, Marathon's prohibition against article I judges,
such as bankruptcy judges, exercising jurisdiction over state-created
causes of action, is avoided.10 Nonetheless, this solution to the Mara-
thon holding is incomplete; it fails to answer the threshold question
of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists at all for the claim to be
Section 362 in effect provides that once a debtor files for bankruptcy no civil judicial
proceeding may commence nor may continue against the debtor until the bankruptcy
case is resolved or the bankruptcy court approves.
4. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
5. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
6. Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824). In Osborn, federal jurisdiction was proper because the bank was created by a
federal charter which determined its substantive rights and liabilities.
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1982, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. II 1984). See infra note 14.
10. 130 CONG. REc. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). Marathon listed several
factors which distinguished article III courts from article I courts. Justice Brennan rea-
soned that the major distinguishing factor was that article III judges serve for life,
whereas article I judges sit for fixed periods of time and are subject to removal from
office much more easily than article III judges.
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heard in a federal court.
Portions of the 1984 Bankruptcy Act seem to indicate Congress
believed that the Court in its Marathon decision sanctioned such
federal district court jurisdiction."' However, this Comment focuses
on those portions12 of the 1984 Bankruptcy Act which mandate trial
of debtor-creditor tort cases in federal district court, and argues that
the provisions are unconstitutional grants of subject matter
judisdiction.
THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS AND FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF
1984
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
198413 (1984 Amendments) includes section 15714 and section
133415 of title 28. Section 157(b)(5) requires, for cases in which a
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1984); see also 130 CONG. REC. S8891
(daily ed. June 29, 1984). Remarks of the drafters in the congressional record indicate
that while the Senate recognized the unconstitutionality of the 1984 amendments, a ma-
jority of those members of the house serving on the joint committee did not.
12. See infra note 14.
13. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
14. This Comment will not attempt to challenge the validity of all portions of
section 157. The relevant portions are as follows:
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any
or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.
(b)(1) Bankruptcy may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core
proceedings arising under title II or arising in a case under title 11 referred
under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and
judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(b) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interest for the pur-
poses of confirming a plan under chapter II or 13 of title I I but not the liqui-
dation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case
under title 11;
(4) Non-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States
Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of section
1334(c)(2).
(5) The district court shall order the personal injury tort and wrongful death
claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pend-
ing, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose, as deter-
mined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. 11 1984) states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on
a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have
debtor under the protection of bankruptcy is a party to a personal
injury or wrongful death action, that the trial be held in the federal
district court. 6 This grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the fed-
eral district courts raises serious constitutional questions.
17
The scope of subject matter jurisdiction held by the bankruptcy
courts is defined in terms of "core prceedings." 18 These core proceed-
ings are those traditionally associated with bankruptcy proceedings
under pre-1971 bankruptcy law.19 Section 157 (b)(2)(B) expressly
excludes personal injury or wrongful death causes of action from the
definition of "core" claims. 20 Even without these section 157(b)(4)
exclusions, 1 it appears that absent a federal question or diversity, no
constitutional basis for federal jurisdiction exists, thus preventing
any federal court from deciding such state tort claims.
22
The 1984 Amendments, as summarized above,23 represent a com-
promise between House and Senate versions of the bill,24 although
the Senate version did not require tort claims to be tried in the dis-
trict court.2 5 The legislative history of the compromise bill reveals
the constitutional concerns shared by many of the principal
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice,
or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from
abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or aris-
ing in or related to a case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law
claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not
arising under title II or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which
an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States ab-
sent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing
such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a
State forum of appropriate jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain made under
this subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. This subsection shall
not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided for by section
362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section applies to an action affect-
ing the property of the estate in bankruptcy.
(d) The district court in which a- case under title II is commenced or is pend-
ing shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of
the debtor as of the commencement of such a case, and of the estate.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. I 1984). See supra note 14.
17. 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(O) (Supp. 11 1984). This portion of the bank-
ruptcy code defines core proceedings. Among the traditional functions of the bankruptcy
court covered by these subsections are subsection (D), orders in respect to obtaining
credit, and subsection (E), orders to turn over property of the estate.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(O) (Supp. 11 1984).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1984). See supra note 14.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) (Supp. 11 1984). See supra note 14.
22. See infra notes 57-130 and accompanying text.
23. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
24. See 130 CONG. REc. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
25. Id.
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drafters.2
Congressional Constitutional Concerns
In the absence of a committee report for the 1984 Amendments,
the legislative history must be gleaned from the floor speeches of the
Amendments' main drafters." As these speeches reveal, Congress
entertained serious constitutional doubts regarding portions of the
1984 Amendments.28 Senator Orrin G. Hatch, a chief draftsman of
the 1984 Amendments, summarized the relevant constitutional
problems as follows:
[P]roblems arise because the conference bill retains the broad jurisdictional
language allowing a bankruptcy court to ajudicate any case related to a
bankruptcy claim. This means that a purely State law case could be liti-
gated in a Federal court with the Federal question jurisdiction necessary
under the Constitution for Federal court adjudication ...
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution specifies the types of cases that
may be litigated in Federal courts. . . . [C]ases "arising" under Federal
law and cases "between citizens of different States." Cases based solely on
State law cannot be adjudicated in any Federal court where there is no
diversity and where the only Federal connection is that one of the parties is
a chapter 11 debtor.
In Marathon, the Supreme Court decided that bankruptcy judges could
not adjudicate State law claims. Marathon did not decide, however, that
Article III courts could constitutionally adjudicate all State law
claims. 29
Perhaps Senator Hatch foresaw the problems which might be cre-
ated by mandating that such tort claims be tried in the federal court.
Illustrative of these problems is Roberts v. Johns-Manville.30 In
Roberts, a federal judge ruled that although the 1984 Amendments
required that a trial be held in the district court, they did not require
that such trials be held immediately. The Roberts judge recognized
26. Id. Senator Hatch, a chief draftsman of the compromise bill, stated:
I have only one regret as I reflect upon this conference product. It involves the
deletion of the Senate-passed mandatory abstention provision. With its dele-
tion, purely State law claims which do not arise under the Bankruptcy Code
are allowed to be tried in State courts. This presents an important constitu-
tional concern. State tort or contract cases in which one party happens to be
bankrupt are still State law claims. They are not Federal questions.
(emphasis added).
Also contained in the same portion of the congressional record are remarks of Senators
Dole and Thurmond as well as a few congressmen, all of whom felt the need to preserve




30. 12 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 879 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
that under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,31 California substantive
law would apply to the tort claim because California was the place
in which the injury occurred.32 Under California law, a claim for
pain and suffering or disfigurement would not survive the claimant if
he died prior to trial.33 Although trial could be held in a California
state court prior to the plaintiff's impending death from asbestosis,
trial in the federal court unavoidably would be delayed. The federal
district court recognized that because of the seriousness of plaintiff's
injury, plaintiff would likely die before a federal trial could occur.
Nonetheless, the judge, compelled to abide by the 1984 Amend-
ments, required that the trial be held in the federal district court.34
The 1984 Amendments thus effectively acted to bar a substantial
portion of the plaintiff's potential recovery.
This Comment discusses four questions raised by the language of
the 1984 Amendments. Does section 157(b)(5)", mandate, or merely
permit, a federal district court to take jurisdiction in an unliquidated
tort case? Does that tort claim arise under article III of the United
States Constitution? Does that same tort claim arise under the bank-
ruptcy statute? For purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, is a tort
claim which has not arisen under the Constitution or under the
bankruptcy statutes ancillary to the bankruptcy?
MANDATORY OR PERMISSIVE JURISDICTION?
Courts have differed in interpreting the language of section
157(b)(5). Some have required the tort claims to be held at the dis-
trict court level, 8 others merely have allowed a district court to hear
them.37 Section 157(b)(5) states:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death
claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is
pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose, as
determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.38
Whether this language is a positive command of exclusive jurisdic-
tion or a mere discretionary matter similar to ancillary jurisdiction is
unclear. In In re UNR Industries, Inc.,39 the court held that the lan-
guage of section 157(b)(5) was clear; it required the district court to
31, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Under Erie, when the basis of a federal district court's
jurisdiction is diversity, the federal court is bound to follow state law.
32. Roberts, 12 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) at 881.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(5) (Supp. 11 1984); see also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 45
Bankr. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
36. See In re UNR Indus,, Inc., 45 Bankr. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
37. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1984) (emphasis added).
39. 45 Bankr. 322 (N.D. I1. 1984).
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hear the tort claim."' Recognizing the doubtful constitutionality of
the 1984 Amendments,41 one court resorted to novel statutory con-
struction to reach desired results.' 2 Contrary to the literal statutory
construction of section 157 in UNR Industries,43 the Sixth Circuit
44
avoided the constitutional issue of section 157 by applying the per-
missive abstention section, section 1334(c)(1). In Citibank, N.A. v.
White Motor Corp.,'6 the court remanded the tort claims against the
defendant-debtor to the state court for trial.'6 Although this leads to
the constitutionally correct result, the legislative history of the 1984
Amendments reveals that the Citibank interpretation of section 1334
is contrary to legislative intent.47 Furthermore, Citibank casts doubt
on the validity of the UNR Industries holding that section 157(b)(5)
requires federal jurisdiction over tort claims involving bankrupt
defendants.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. 8
The basis of their jurisdiction is found in article III, section 2 of the
Constitution. 49 As early as Marbury v. Madison,50 and as recently as
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,51 the Supreme
Court has struck down congressional acts which attempt to grant
unconstitutional subject matter jurisdiction.
Congress passed the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments after close
scrutiny of their content.52 Although such scrutiny should be consid-
ered before declaring an act unconstitutional,53 it is still the Court,
however, which ultimately interprets the Constitution. 54 A state-cre-
40. Id.
41. Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp., 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
42. Id.
43. 45 Bankr. 322 (N.D. IU1. 1984).
44. Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp., 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985). See
supra note 15.
45. 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
46. Id.
47. 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
48. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3522 (2d ed. 1984).
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
50. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
51. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
52. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
53. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 61.
54. The Marathon court stated:
[d]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Con-
stitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch
ated tort claim, by itself, does not pose a federal question for pur-
poses of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, article III permits such a
tort claim to be heard in federal court only in cases in which juris-
diction is based upon diversity of citizenship,55 or if the tort claim is
pendent to a federal claim.56
A Claim Must Arise Under Both the Constitution and the Statute
Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution
provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Au-
thority. . . . "5 A tort claim seemingly does not arise under the
Constitution simply because a debtor seeks the protection of federal
bankruptcy acts to avoid the claim. Further, even if a court were to
conclude that a tort claim does arise under federal law when the
defendant is a debtor in bankruptcy, a second hurdle must be over-
come: the person seeking a trial in a federal forum also must show
that the case arises under section 157 of the bankruptcy
amendments.58
Tort Causes of Action Do Not Arise Under Article III of the
Constitution
In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,59 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed Osborn v. Bank of the United States0 as providing
the controlling test to determine whether an action arises under arti-
cle 111.61 Under the Osborn test, "it [is] a sufficient foundation for
jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the party, may be de-
feated by one construction of the Constitution or law of the United
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is the responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.
Id. at 62 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). Further, the Court noted
that several other courts had considered Congress' substantial doubts regarding the con-
stitutionality of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, which were much the same concerns that the
98th Congress indicated in its passage of the 1984 Amendments. Marathon, 458 U.S. at
57 n.9.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). Section 1332 provides that the "district court shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
value of $10,000 ... and is between - (1) citizens of different states.
56. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
57. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
58. See generally Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480
(1983) (jurisdiction was proper because the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act deter-
mined when a sovereign could be sued).
59. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
60. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
61. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492.
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States, and sustained by the opposite construction." 62 The Court up-
held federal jurisdiction in Osborn because the bank was a creature
of a federal charter, and its rights and obligations were determined
by that charter.63 However, the Court noted that the character of the
parties and the character of the case must remain separate.6 4 As an
example of this separation, the Court indicated that although a natu-
ralized citizen is a citizen via a legislative act, that act alone is insuf-
ficient to gain access to a federal court for a matter unrelated to the
naturalization acts.65 In other words, merely because a special provi-
sion of United States law allows for naturalization, that same law
does not give naturalized citizens an additional right to a federal
forum.
Although federal subject matter jurisdiction has been upheld
based upon a party's status as an entity of federal creation, it has
been done only when the act which conferred exclusive federal juris-
diction also defined the rights and obligations of the entity.66 The
1984 Amendments fail to do this. Instead, the amendments work in
a manner much the same as a naturalization act. The defendant is a
debtor by the grace of a federal act, but that act does not define his
rights or obligations for unliquidated tort claims: it merely defines
the manner of liquidation.67
In Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria,8 the Court upheld
federal jurisdiction based upon the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.6 9 The Verlinden Court reasoned that the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act must be read as a whole; as such, the jurisdictional
portions of the act were within congressional powers under the neces-
sary and proper clause of article I. Arguably, the Court's decision in
Verlinden, by analogy, effectively negates the proposition that a de-
fendant's status as a debtor is insufficient to federalize an unliqui-
dated tort claim for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction.7 0 Such
62. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822.
63. Id. at 756.
64. Id. at 814.
65. Id. at 827.
66. See generally United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1879) (railroad
was created under a federal charter which created many of its rights and obligations);
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act contains substantive law which determines when a sovereign can be
sued).
67. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1984). See supra note 14.
68. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
69. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
70. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
an argument likely would state that because Congress is empowered
to pass bankruptcy laws under its necessary and proper powers, it
therefore can prescribe jurisdiction to a federal district court. How-
ever, the argument is fallacious.
On its face, Verlinden stands for the proposition that even if state
law provides the rule of decision, Congress still is empowered to give
the federal judiciary exclusive jurisdiction. 71 Nevertheless, Verlinden
held that Congress may not expand the limits of the lower federal
courts' jurisdiction beyond the Constitution.72 In dicta, the Court
maintained its holdings that a statute which acted simply as a juris-
dictional statute without substantive purpose cannot pass article III
scrutiny.73 But the Court refused to determine the point at which the
"speculative possibility that a federal question may arise at some
point in the proceeding. . ." violates article III.
74
It appears that Congress has not chosen to draft the 1984 Amend-
ments so that a federal question is a mere "speculative possibility."
75
The trial of a tort claim in the federal district court appears to reach
the point of "speculative possibility" referred to in Verlinden.71 Con-
trary to the statutes in Verlinden which defined the rights and obli-
gations of a sovereign to be sued in the first instance, section
157(b)(5) does not provide substantive law for the rights and obliga-
tions of a debtor prior to liquidation of the tort claim; section 157
grants the federal district court exclusive jurisdiction to hear unliq-
uidated tort claims by or against the bankrupt debtor.7 7 This statu-
tory vesting of subject matter jurisdiction constitutionally cannot be
self-supporting.
Unliquidated Tort Claims Do Not Arise Under the Bankruptcy
Amendments
In order for a case to arise under a valid federal statute, a plain-
tiff's cause of action must include as an "essential element," a right
or immunity embodied either in the Constitution or in the laws of
the United States.7 8 "The right or immunity must be such that it
will be supported if the . . . laws . . . are given one construction
.. . and defeated if they receive another. 7 9 Using this statutory
construction test,80 unliquidated tort claims present no federal ques-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 491.
73. Id. at 496.
74. Id. at 493.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1984).
78. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936).
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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tions in cases in which the rights and immunities are defined clearly
by state law. While the ultimate payment of a judgment is the sub-
ject of bankruptcy proceedings, the law which determines tort liabil-
ity in the first instance is not.81
In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Mottley,82 the
plaintiff, in order to obtain federal jurisdiction, alleged that he was
unable to honor his contractual obligation because of an act of Con-
gress. The Court stated: "Although such allegations show that very
likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the Constitu-
tion would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff's
original cause of action, arises under the constitution.18 3 By applying
similar reasoning to the trial of a tort claim in a federal district
court based upon section 157(b)(5),84 only one conclusion may be
reached: the plaintiff's complaint only will allege state tort questions.
Hence, the cause of action does not arise under section 157(b)(5).
The effect of section 157 is similar to the effects of the federal
removal statutes.8 5 Under the provisions of section 157, a bankrupt
defendant effectively may remove to the federal court an action
pending in state court. The reasoning behind the section, although
tenuous, is based upon the impact which filing bankruptcy has upon
the liquidation of any judgment rendered in a state court.8 Re-
cently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection of this theory of
removal-premised on possible federally-based defenses-in
Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction La-
borers Vacation Trust for Southern California.7
The defendant trustees in Construction Laborers contended that
section 514 of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)'8 preempted state law, thereby precluding the state tax
board from levying a tax claim.89 The Court, relying upon Justice
81. See generally Roberts v. Johns-Manville, 12 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 879
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
82. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
83. Id. at 152.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1984).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act
of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts. .. have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant. . .to the district court. . ."
86. See generally Roberts v. Johns-Manville, 12 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 879
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays liquidation of judgment.
87. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
89. Construction Laborers, 463 U.S. at 6; see also Public Serv. Comm. v. Wycoff
Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952) (stating "it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain an
action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense . . . to a threatened cause of
Cardozo's opinion in Gully v. First National Bank,90 effectively held
that before the defendant could raise a defense based upon federal
preemption, the plaintiff first must prove a violation of a state law
claim.9' Similar reasoning should apply for the trial of tort claims. If
a tort plaintiff brings suit in a state court, the defendant might claim
that his status as a debtor under the court's protection preempts full
payment of the judgment. Nonetheless, following the rational of
Construction Laborers,92 the defendant-debtor may not claim federal
preemption until the plaintiff has won his state court action. Since
selecting the court in which a case is to be tried often has substantive
impact on the outcome of the case, plaintiffs should not be deprived
of the procedural benefits available under state law simply because a
defendant raises a federally-created defense to the payment of the
judgment.9 3 Indeed, some cases exist in which the defendant is ade-
quately insured and the reason for filing bankruptcy is unrelated to
the tort actions.94 In such cases the defense is unwarranted.
A further question also must be addressed: Does the bankruptcy
court's control of the debtor's estate create a federal nexus sufficient
to federalize the litigation? Courts have held that state law contract
actions are federalized by the court's constructive possession of the
debtor's estate."5 When an entity files bankruptcy, the court super-
vises the payment of all debts of the debtor. The payment of debts
which result from obligations defined by liquidated contracts entered
into before the debtor's bankruptcy are termed "turnover pay-
ments."9 8 These "turnover payments" are at the heart of a tradi-
tional bankruptcy.9 7 In a bankruptcy action in which the debtor does
not retain possession of the estate, it is simply the court which makes
the debt, or turnover, payments.98 No underlying litigation is in-
volved; rather, all that is involved is payment of an acknowledged
debt. In contrast, section 157 mandates trial of tort claims in cases
action").
90. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
91. Construction Laborers, 463 U.S. at 11.
92. Id.
93. See Roberts, 12 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) at 881 n.4.
94. See, e.g., In re White Farm Equip. Co., 38 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984). In this case, products liability suits were not responsible for the bankruptcy;
rather, the debtor had adequate insurance to cover liability. The court remanded the case
to the bankruptcy court for purposes of estimating the amount of damage.
95. In re Perry, Adams & Lewis Securities, 30 Bankr. 845, 855 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1983). In this case, the trustee sought return of payments made to corporate officers
just prior to the filing of the bankruptcy.
96. See, e.g., In re S.E. Hornsby & Sons Sand & Gravel Co., 12 BANKR. CT.
DEC. (CRR) 713 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
97. See generally In re Baldwin-United Corp., 48 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985) (intimating that a turnover proceeding is implicitly a core proceeding).
98. See generally In re S.E. Hornsby & Sons Sand & Gravel Co., 12 BANKR. CT.
DEC, (CRR) 713 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
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in which tort liability and valuation are disputed.99 Moreover, con-
tract liability is fixed by the terms of the contract; it has a predeter-
mined effect on the estate of the debtor. On the other hand, tort
liability and valuation are much more complex; each case must be
decided on its own merits. The court would have to maintain control
of the estate until all claims were valued, a process which undoubt-
edly would be delayed by consolidating in one federal district court
hundreds of cases pending in numerous state courts.
However, under section 502(c) (1) of title 11, a bankruptcy judge
is authorized to estimate "any contingent or unliquidated claim, fix-
ing, or liquidation . . . which. . . would unduly delay the closing of
the case." 100 Interpreting this language in order to prevent one stat-
ute from interfering with the rights established under another stat-
ute,101 courts have been able to balance the competing interests of
plaintiffs-trying the underlying tort action in state court-with
those of the defendant-preserving his estate. Nevertheless, if the
court were to allow possession of the debtor's estate to determine
jurisdiction, countless problems could arise.10 2
For example, in In re Baldwin-United Corp.,0 3 the court held that
simply by filing a proof of claim, a party indicates a willingness to
have the bankruptcy court determine both "the validity and amount
of that claim."110 4 This holding seems to revive a previously rejected
theory of jurisdiction, commonly known as "jurisdiction by am-
bush; ' ' 10 5 however, "[i]t remains to be seen whether these decisions
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1984).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1982).
101. Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp., 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
102. For example, if this approach were followed, jurisdiction could be established
over nondebtor third-party defendants, in which case a problem of improper joinder of
claims easily could be imagined. A plaintiff could name as a defendant a third-party by
claiming that this party might be liable to the primary defendant. In this manner, if the
only federal nexus was the primary defendant's status as a debtor, a plaintiff could cir-
cumvent federal jurisdictional requirements.
103. 48 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
104. Baldwin-United, 48 Bankr. at 54; see also In re Marketing Resources Int'l
Corp., 43 Bankr. 71 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
105. In effect the theory of jurisdiction by ambush reinstitutes a portion of the
1898 Bankruptcy Act which recognized a party's ability to consent unwittingly to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction by filing a proof of claim in a case. In Marketing Re-
sources, the filing of a proof of a claim by the creditor was deemed sufficient to subject
him to the bankruptcy court's general jurisdiction. 43 Bankr. at 71. The ramifications of
this type of summary jurisdiction is exemplified by the extension of the theory in In re
Lombard-Wall, Inc., 12 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 678, 683-84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
In Lombard-Wall, the court held that a creditor's consent to the bankruptcy court's ju-
risdiction, implied from the filing of a claim and the subsequent failure to object to a
reorganization plan, not only subjected the creditor to the court's jurisdiction, but also
[supporting jurisdiction by ambush] represent a major new current
in jurisdictional thinking or are merely a small wave on a troubled
sea." 0
6
Finally, in dealing with the "arising under" language of article
III,107 one must address a theory related to jurisdiction by am-
bush-the theory of protective jurisdiction. Under protective juris-
diction, Congress can grant subject matter jurisdiction to the federal
judiciary in situations in which it has general legislative power to
regulate in a given area. Such a grant of jurisdiction, in and of itself,
is a law of the United States for purposes of article III. Conse-
quently, under a protective jurisdiction theory, federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction despite the fact that Congress has not en-
acted any substantive rules of decision. In such cases, state law
would be controlling.
10 8
Protective jurisdiction is traced back to Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.09 In Osborn, the
court held that a federally chartered bank could sue in federal court
even if state law controlled and no diversity of citizenship existed.
Because the trustee in a bankruptcy case is an officer of the federal
court, 10 Osborn arguably suggests that claims which result from the
success of a plaintiff's tort action should be under the federal court's
protective jurisdiction. However, the law which created the bank in
Osborn controlled its rights and obligations;"' Congress has not de-
fined a debtor's tort rights and obligations.
Although individual members of the Court have endorsed the the-
ory of protective jurisdiction, never has a majority of the Court en-
dorsed such a theory,"12 although the Court approached endorsement
in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala-
bama."13 In Lincoln Mills, the Court reasoned that because the case
arose under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, the lower federal
courts were required to apply federal common law regarding labor-
management." 4 Thus, in reality, the Lincoln Mills case arose under
served to deprive him of the right to a jury trial.
106. Hendel & Reinhardt, Evolution of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction After the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 90 COM. L.J. 272, 275-76
(1985).
107. But see infra notes 115-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
ancillary jurisdiction question.
108. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL L. REv.
157, 184-96 (1953).
109. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
110. II U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (providing for appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy
who gathers all the debtor's assets with which to pay outstanding debts.)
111. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738.
112. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The
decision was arrived at by a 6-3 vote against upholding protective jurisdiction.
113. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
114. Id.
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federal substantive law rather than state law.
UNLIQUIDATED TORT CLAIMS ARE NOT PENDENT OR ANCILLARY
TO BANKRUPTCY
In Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp.,115 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that the effect of section 157 is similar to the
effects of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. 16 The Supreme Court
developed the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in order
to expand a lower federal court's power to hear all relevant matters
relating to a "case" properly before it.117 Under the current defini-
tion of ancillary jurisdiction, 118 however, unliquidated"19 tort claims
are not a proper ancillary subject for the federal courts.
The genesis of ancillary jurisdiction in part can be attributed to
the Supreme Court's decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States 20 in which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
[W] hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by
the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power
of Congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although
other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.1
2'
In the 1966 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs case, 22 the Court fi-
nally formulated the current test of ancillary jurisdiction: a federal
district court will have jurisdiction if the federal and state claims are
"derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative fact" and are such
that they would "ordinarily be expected [to be tried] . . . in one
judicial proceeding."' 2 3 Under this test, a federal claim must exist to
which the state claim can be ancillary. No such federal claim exists
when the only federal question is the defendant's status as a
debtor. 24 The operative facts which give rise to a tort action gener-
115. 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
116. Id. at 273.
117. See generally C. WRIGHT. LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 7-16 (4th ed. 1983).
118. See infra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
119. A liquidated tort claim is one in which the defendant's liability for monetary
damages either is known or is undisputed. On the other hand, an unliquidated claim
either is contingent or is disputed. See generally Comment, Product Liability Claims in
the Bankruptcy Courts After the 1984 Amendments: Four Standards to Limit "Related
to" Jurisdiction, 17 U.C.D. L. REV. 1247, 1258 n.38 (1984).
120. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
121. Id. at 823. Notably, Justice Marshall uses the word "cause", rather than the
constitutional "case", which is perhaps an indication of the reluctance to judicially ex-
pand the constitution.
122. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
123. Id. at 725.
124. See supra notes 59-114 and accompanying text.
ally are not those of a bankruptcy. As previously stated,12 some
debtors are adequately insured and have declared bankruptcy for
matters totally unrelated to tort liability. Further, the bankruptcy
status of a defendant acts only as a defense to the full payment of a
judgment; it does not define the defendant's tort rights and liabili-
ties. Thus, merely filing a bankruptcy will not leave the court with
federal subject matter jurisdiction.
In Gibbs, the Court drew a sharp distinction between the constitu-
tional powers given a court and its discretionary exercise of that
power.126 The Court listed several factors which are to be used by a
district court in deciding whether to exercise such discretionary
power.127 Specifically, courts should consider judicial economy, fair-
ness, and convenience to the litigants. 28 Moreover, the Court stated
that the lower federal courts should hesitate to exercise pendent or
ancillary jurisdiction when "state issues substantially predominate,
whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought."' 29 Thus even if a court
were incorrectly to assume that ancillary jurisdiction applies to sec-
tion 157 cases, the Court's reasoning in Gibbs is applicable. Given
the ordinary predominance of state law issues in a tort action, the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over such a claim would seemingly
constitute an abuse of discretion.
One recent appellate decision' 30 demonstrates that in state law
cases, judicial survival and fairness to litigants demands that a dis-
trict court not stretch the concept of ancillary jurisdiction.13' A sin-
gle federal district court is not equipped to handle mass litigants,
125. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
126. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 726.
129. Id.
130. In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.
Supp. 906 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, April 7, 1977). The court indicates
in the Asbestos Litigation case why it would be unreasonable to try, with the thousands
of claimants, all claims in one forum. Although this case was decided prior to the 1984
Amendments, its logic still is applicable: each defendant's liability would depend on his
individual knowledge of the health risk posed by asbestosis.
131. See Asbestos Litigation, 431 F. Supp. 906. A similar problem to that of ancil-
lary jurisdiction is presented where the defendant is a nonbankrupt distributor of a given
product. In In re Pacor v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984), Pacor, a distributor of
asbestos for Johns-Manville, sought to have a pending suit in which he was a defendant
transferred to the district court which was trying the Johns-Manville controversy. Pacor
alleged that if the plaintiff were successful in his suit, then Johns-Manville ultimately
might be liable. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976), to overcome the fact that the suit against Pacor might have an effect on
the Johns-Manville estate; instead the court held that judicial economy itself does not
justify federal jurisdiction. 743 F.2d at 994. The Pacor holding appears to support the
proposition that ancillary jurisdiction should be extremely limited in the trial of tort
claims casually related to bankruptcy.
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each presenting different claims, and a single litigant is not prepared
to lose state-created procedural advantage because of a defendant's
status as a debtor in bankruptcy.
1 12
CONCLUSION
Although clearly the Supreme Court's opinion in Northern Pipe-
line Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.133 indicated to Congress that the
1978 Bankruptcy Act was unconstitutional, equally clear is that the
congressional response as contained in the 1984 Amendments is un-
constitutional as well. Perhaps the premise which Congress did not
articulate was that many debtors would be able to avail themselves
of a federal forum based on diversity of citizenship, due to the na-
ture of mass tort claims. However, the 1984 Amendments are not so
limited. They expand federal subject matter jurisdiction beyond di-
versity, beyond federal questions, and most importantly, beyond arti-
cle III.
Although one court has avoided the constitutional issue by juxta-
posing one section of the 1984 Amendments against the other,
clearly the legislative history of the section upon which the court
relied was inapplicable. Other courts have not been as willing to in-
terpret the amendments so broadly.
It does not appear that any court has stated that a tort claim is an
article III subject. Implicit in the Marathon decision is that all state-
created causes of action are not to be tried in a bankruptcy forum.
Just as Marathon indicated that Congress may not provide to article
I courts that which the Constitution does not provide, Congress also
must realize and be informed by the Court that it cannot provide to
article III courts that which the Constitution does not provide. To
allow otherwise is to allow Congress, by a simple legislative act, to
supersede the limits the founding fathers placed upon the federal ju-
diciary through article I and article III of the Constitution.
SHELDON A. WILENSKY
132. See generally Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp., 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.
1985).
133. 458 U.S. 50 (1981).

